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NRC INSPECTION MANUAL PDND
INSPECTION PROCEDURE 60801
SPENT FUEL POOL SAFETY
AT PERMANENTLY SHUTDOWN REACTORS
PROGRAM APPLICABILITY:  2561
SALP FUNCTIONAL AREA:  N/A
60801-01 INSPECTION  OBJECTIVE
To verify the safe wet storage of spent fuel at permanently
shutdown reactors.
60801-02 INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS
02.01 Siphon and drain protection.  Evaluate the configuration
of the spent fuel pool (SFP), SFP piping, and any interconnected
piping systems to ascertain whether conditions represent a siphon
or drain path.  Assess licensee procedures to ensure that active or
passive drain systems are properly maintained and temporary hoses
are appropriately controlled.  Assess the safety significance of
the worst-case inadvertent siphon or drain event.  Verify that
appropriate  compensatory measures, procedures, training, or
engineered features have been implemented.
02.02 SFP instrumentation, alarms, and leakage detection.
Review and evaluate whether the SFP instrumentation, alarms and
leakage detection systems are adequate to assure the safe wet
storage of spent fuel.  This review should include SFP water level
instrumentation,  calibration,  alarm setpoints, alarm response
procedures, data taking and tending, and related operator rounds.
SFP leakage collection systems, associated alarms, level and/or
flow instrumentation and logging and trending of data should also
be evaluated.
02.03 SFP chemistry and cleanliness control.  Review the SFP
chemistry and cleanliness control programs.  Utilizing field
observations and record reviews, verify satisfactory implementation
of the programs as applied to systems and components necessary for
safe spent fuel storage.  Determine whether water purity standards,
radionuclide  concentration, and boron concentration (if applicable)
are on accordance with technical specification (TS) requirements
and docketed commitments.  Ascertain whether the licensee's foreign60801 - 2 - Issue Date:  08/11/97
material  exclusion, combustible material control, and SFP
chemistry procedures adequately protects the integrity and cooling
of spent fuel.Issue Date:  08/11/97 - 3 - 60801
02.04  Criticality controls.  Review and evaluate the licensee's
controls for criticality monitoring of wet spent fuel storage.
This assessment should  include receipt, storage, and transfer
records; inventory records; criticality geometry controls; soluble
boron management and non-soluble poison design features; and, heavy
load restrictions, worst-case drop analysis, and seismic
considerations to prevent adverse geometry reconfiguration.
02.05  SFP Operation and Power Supply.  Review licensee procedures,
drawings, and Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report
(PSDAR) descriptions regarding SFP operation and power supplies.
Ascertain whether SFP operation is equivalent to that when the
system was in operation during reactor power operations.  Identify
situations where differing operational strategies, system line-ups,
etc. could be outside system design or be detrimental to long-term
system operability or safe fuel storage.  Assess the reliability of
the SFP electrical power supply.
60801-03 INSPECTION GUIDANCE
General Guidance
This inspection procedure resulted, in part, from long-term actions
taken by the NRC in response to Bulletin 94-01, "Potential Fuel
Pool Draindown Caused by Inadequate Maintenance Practices at
Dresden Unit 1," and a determination by the NRC staff that NRC
inspection of power reactors undergoing decommissioning provides
additional assurance that licensed activities will not be adverse
to public health and safety.  A primary objective of this
inspection procedure (IP) is to verify that each  licensee
maintaining spent fuel in wet storage provides appropriate controls
and maintains adequate systems to prevent adverse radiological
conditions.  This IP applies to all states of decommissioning from
the permanent cessation of reactor operations until the fuel is
safely transferred from the SFP to a independent spent fuel storage
installation or other licensed fuel storage system.
The inspector is not required to complete all the inspection
requirements listed in this IP nor is the inspector limited to
those inspection requirements listed if safety concerns are
identified.  However, the objectives of this IP shall be met and
the initial performance of this inspection shall be commensurate
with the staff effort associated with the NRC's assessment of
licensee performance regarding the safety concerns described in
Bulletin 94-01.  Subsequent inspections may be less comprehensive,
based on the controls and adequacy of structures, systems, and
components  maintaining spent fuel integrity and radiation
shielding.  These latter inspections should correspond to the
number of licensee modifications made, the extent of any SFP
problems (including leakage), and any completed or planned fuel
movements.
Temporary  Instruction (TI) 2561/002 inspections provided a baseline
review of the siphon  and drain potential at most permanently
shutdown reactors.  When implementing this IP at these licensees,
the inspector should examine any changes made to SFP systems and60801 - 4 - Issue Date:  08/11/97
interconnecting systems since the conduct of TI 2561/002.  If TI
2561/002 has not been performed, this IP should be completed in its
entirety to ascertain whether wet spent fuel storage is safe.
This IP tends to balance the relatively low safety significance of
a loss of SFP cooling with providing adequate assurances through
inspection and verification that spent fuel in wet storage is safe.
The inspector should understand licensee evaluations, assumptions,
and acceptance criteria regarding safe spent fuel storage and make
conclusions based on, in part, the information provided in the
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), PSDAR, or discussions with the
NRC staff.
Specific Guidance
03.01  Siphon and drain protection.  The licensee should be
knowledgeable of any potential siphon or drain paths and have plans
or procedures that can identify, resolve, and minimize the
probability of occurrence of an inadvertent/undetected drain or
siphon.  This and other considerations should have been documented
by the licensee in their response to Bulletin 94-01.  The licensee
should have also summarized their SFP inventory management and
emergency response strategies; addressed radiation protection and
spent  fuel cooling during abnormal situations; provided information
on SFP leakage; and,  detailed their siphon and draindown
evaluations.  In the case where the plant has been shutdown for a
number of years, spent fuel cooling may no longer be a significant
safety issue, therefore the licensee's response strategy could be
focused primarily on minimizing radiation exposure.  Bulletin 94-01
and Information Notices 93-83, 88-65, and 87-13 discuss some
mechanisms for loss of SFP inventory and potential consequences.
If the bulletin response had not received NRC inspection, the
inspector should review the licensee's response, verify
implementation of docketed actions, and assess the license's safety
evaluations.  TI 2561/002 should be used as a guide.
The licensee should conduct appropriate training to respond and
mitigate a loss of SFP inventory.  Response actions should be
commensurate with safety and maintaining radiation exposure as low
as reasonably achievable (ALARA).  The inspector should walkdown
and inspect the SFP system (including all accessible points and
liner penetrations) for material conditions and integrity; review
any repairs conducted on the SFP liner; evaluate SFP system
configuration control based on field conditions and licensing basis
documentation; and, ascertain the seismic qualification of the SFP
systems.  Particular focus should be on the evaluation of system
low points, active and passive drain pathways, primary and
secondary makeup water supplies, and SFP boundary integrity
control.  The inspector should also assess the licensee's actions
in response to a SFP zirconium fire resulting from a draindown of
the SFP.     
03.02  SFP instrumentation, alarms, and leakage detection.  The SFP
water level instrumentation and alarms should ensure that any
significant loss of inventory will be promptly detected by
operations personnel.  Response to alarm procedures should requireIssue Date:  08/11/97 - 5 - 60801
a leakage assessment and contingency actions including makeup,
cooling, and radiological considerations, as appropriate.  The
instrumentation and alarms should be periodically calibrated in
accordance with the TSs, procedures, or Bulletin 94-01 response
actions.  Operator rounds and control room logs should provide a
data base sufficient to identify SFP leakage problems.  If
installed, a SFP leakage collection system will usually be
described in licensing basis documentation.  If this system is
alarmed, an instrument check and operability check of the
instrumentation and alarms should be performed periodically.  If
the licensee uses operator rounds to survey the leakage collection
volume, review the logged data, and assess the data trend.
Within the scope of this inspection, the inspector should evaluate
the tests or analytical calculations performed to determine SFP
leakage and evaporation rates.  The assumptions in these tests and
calculations should be assessed and evaluated.  For example, a
licensee may bound their analyses by a worst-case situation and
normalized  environmental conditions.  These analyses may be
described in the licensee's response to Bulletin 94-01.  Although
sound engineering practices may have been used by the licensee, the
inspector should be particularly aware of any licensee assumptions,
instrument accuracies, or surveillance frequencies that tend to
mask or diminish calculational accuracy.
The inspector should also review data from the licensee's
environmental monitoring program, if applicable, to determine if
there are indications of SFP leakage into the environment.  The
inspector should communicate with the headquarters staff regarding
findings  involving ground water transport of radiological effluents
from the SFP.
03.03  SFP chemistry and cleanliness control.  SFP water purity,
radionuclide, and dissolved boron limits will typically be stated
in the TSs or docketed commitments.  Water purity limits for pH,
conductivity, chlorides, fluorides, and sulfates are generally
stated in NRC requirements or in ANSI standards.  The inspector
should review the results of chemical analyses, evaluate the data,
and assess identified trends.  Although the scope of this chemistry
review does not ascertain the rigor or technique of chemical
analyses, the inspector should verify that standards, reagents, and
analytical chemicals are in date and adequately controlled.  The
inspector should also verify that analytical equipment used for SFP
chemistry analyses are calibrated and meet surveillance
requirements.  A primary focus of a SFP chemistry program should
protect against inadvertent criticality (e.g., soluble boron
analysis) and prevent an accelerated degradation of spent fuel and
SFP liner integrity.
The inspector should ascertain whether the licensee has implemented
a foreign materials exclusion control program or other housekeeping
measure to provide assurance that the inadvertent introduction of
foreign materials into the SFP is not adverse to the safe wet
storage of spent fuel.  These materials could either be chemical or
mechanical in nature.  Program considerations could include, in
part, housekeeping, cleanliness  boundaries, and administrative
accountability of loose materials.60801 - 6 - Issue Date:  08/11/97
A tour of the SFP should be performed to ascertain the quality of
housekeeping in and about the SFP.  Particular attention should be
focused on the identification of materials that do not add value to
the safe storage of spent fuel.  These materials could include, but
are not limited to:  heavy materials supported in the SFP from the
SFP curb or rail without structural or seismic analysis; excessive
combustible loading beyond that described in the Fire  Hazards
Analysis or Fire Protection Plan; clear plastic bags within the
pool  that  could go undetected and reduce spent fuel channel
cooling; and, uncontrolled material in or about the SFP that could
chemically or mechanically degrade the fuel, SFP liner, or support
systems.  Further guidance regarding the storage of components on
the inner sides of the SFP or hanging from the SFP curb or handrail
can be found in Information Notice 87-13.  Information in this
notice includes a discussion of "short hangers" which involved the
storage of highly irradiated materials above the top of the spent
fuel.  Inadequate  control of highly irradiated components can
represent a safety concern.  Regulation Guide 8.38, "Control of
Access to High and Very High Radiation Areas in Nuclear Power
Plants," section C.4.2., provides additional information regarding
controls for storage of materials in spent fuel pools.
03.04  Criticality controls.  Generally, a variety of TS
requirements and docketed commitments provides sufficient assurance
that spent fuel storage will preclude criticality.  These
requirements and commitments could be described in the TSs, FSAR,
PSDAR, or other licensee documents.  Engineered design features
that maintain acceptable geometry will generally involve fuel
assembly rack spacing, boraflex or other permanent neutron
absorbers (Generic Letter 96-04), and physical design features.
Administrative considerations may include procedural precautions,
instructions, water temperature control, and dual verifications for
fuel loading and transfers.  Seismic considerations and heavy load
handling limitations (including bridge and crane interlocks) will
generally be required to preclude a fuel handling event that has
the potential for crushing fuel assemblies into a critical
geometry.
During fuel transfers to independent spent fuel storage
installations, close coordination with the Spent Fuel Project
Office, NMSS, is required.  As described in NMSS IP 60855, other
design considerations and regulatory requirements are applicable
during this type of fuel transfer.  In particular, the safe
transportation of spent fuel would be dependent on, in part, a well
controlled and managed fuel loading schedule, timely draindown and
cooling of spent fuel while in the interim fuel transfer casks, and
heavy lift and load pathway considerations.  The inspector may use
IP 60855 or other NMSS IPs as guides, if necessary.
The inspection effort should assess licensee control of the heavy
loads over the spent fuel.  The inspector should review NUREG 0612,
"Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," and assess the
quality of the licensee controls and procedures.  Appropriate
instructions,  precautions, and prerequisites should be established
to assure that TS requirements are met and the worst-case fuel
damage and dose generation would not exceed safety and licensing
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the licensee appropriately changed their licensing basis based on
changes in the worst-case drop analysis.  For example, an original
license safety evaluation report may not have reviewed the
consequences of a spent fuel transfer cask drop in or about the
vicinity of a spent fuel pool.  The potential safety consequences
of this occurrence could exceeded those associated with a spent
fuel assembly drop accident.
03.05 SFP Operation and  Power Supply.  Based on lessons
learned, the NRC staff has reviewed industry situations involving
less than fully evaluated SFP operation and less than expected
reliability of SFP electrical power supplies.  For example, a loss
of offsite power due to electrical storm caused one utility to lose
all SFP indication and system power for a few hours.  At two other
utilities, dismantlement activities resulted in the temporary loss
of electrical power until compensatory actions were implemented.
At a another utility, biological growth within the SFP reflected
poorly on spent fuel storage conditions.  Although the NRC staff
confirmed that these situations were not immediately adverse to the
safe  wet storage of spent fuel and that SFP operation was in
accordance with licensed conditions, from a licensee performance
perspective they demonstrated vulnerability.
One objective of this IP is to assess the functional operation and
design of the SFP electrical systems.  Therefore, the inspector
should, if possible, obtain the SFP operation procedure from when
the power reactor was in operation and vendor system design
information and compare  this information to the current SFP
operation procedure in-use during decommissioning.  Differences in
operation should have been assessed and justified by the license as
a potential 10 CFR 50.59 or defacto modification (reference Manual
Chapter 2561, "Decommissioning Power Reactor Inspection Program,"
for the appropriate reference IP).  The inspector should evaluate
these changes to system operation and ascertain whether the changes
were appropriate.  For example, the licensee may:  (1) excessively
throttle SFP cooling discharge valves to minimize the SFP cooldown
rate at the cost of accelerated seat  and disk wear and flow
cavitation; (2) remove electrical system loads and unknowingly
cause higher operating voltages at SFP components and
instrumentation  resulting in electrical degradation; or, (3)
curtail SFP ion exchanger and filter operation to minimize
consumable and electrical consumption thereby degrading SFP
chemistry and biological conditions.
60801-04   RESOURCE ESTIMATE
The initial semi-annual completion of this procedure (with no TI
2561/002 inspection) is estimated to require 32 onsite inspection
hours semi-annually.
60801-05   REFERENCES
Bulletin 94-01: Potential Fuel Pool Draindown Caused by Inadequate
Maintenance Practices at Dresden Unit 1 (NUDOCS MF 78923/034-044)60801 - 8 - Issue Date:  08/11/97
Information Notice 93-83: Potential Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling
Following a Loss of Cooling Accident (LOCA) (NUDOCS MF 76799/111-
117)
Information Notice 90-33: Sources of Unexpected Occupational
Radiation Exposures at Spent Fuel Storage Pools (NUDOCS MF
53742/100-202)
Information Notice 88-65: Inadvertent Drainages of Spent Fuel Pools
(NUDOCS MF 69467/004-014)
Information Notice 87-13: Potential for High Radiation Fields
Following Loss of Water from Fuel Pool (NUDOCS MF 39784/009-115)
IE Bulletin 79-24 (NUDOCS 04717/280)
ANSI/N14.6-1993, "For Radioactive Materials - Special Lifting
Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or
More."
NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," July
1980.  Licensee implementation of this NUREG will vary and specific
commitments to this guidance are covered by licensee review of NRC
Generic Letters 80-113 and 85-11.222.
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